Intel Corp. Sure Seems to Violate the Sherman Act Alot, Proof of RICO Complaints and Fraud.

Where is the FTC, the SEC, the Dept. of Justice ??

Does Anyone Really Care?

Intel Corp. has Committed Massive Shareholder Fraud over Decades.. and YOU pay the Price. .Paul Otellini - Intel Corp. CEO and Bruce Sewell Past Intel General Counsel KNEW all along and still cover up massive shareholder fraud..

Part Two..

"Please be advised this analyst is opposed to Intel closed door settlement with FTC on or before July 22; transparency being at issue. Commissioners and discovery team know RICO, Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 per se violations are documented.

This analyst encourages the September hearing proceed accordingly for full disclosure, full remedies, consumer recovery which is a core value of the FTC’s charter.

Advantageously and for hearing efficiency, all Section 2 Rule of Reason claims lacking specific per se condemnation precedent, can be reviewed between the Section 1 and RICO Proofs, without fear of FTC 9341 overall case loss.

Including waste of Federal financial and manpower resource, further, that FCA has already been won on weight of evidence and is itself capable of recovering a portion, if not all, FTC 9341 litigation costs.

This analyst believes it important that every American know how to spot competition espionage occurring in the work place in real time, how to report in real time, how to resolve in real time and not over 18 year’s time as in my case.

In this continuing case of Intel Monopoly analysis, meant for FTC and DOJ discovery, leadership, error correction, law augments, inter Nation competition policy evolution, Intel Network, system and structural improvement, RICO and competition remedies and consumer recoveries.

In addition financial recovery of the economic damages for all targets harmed and pushed under by Intel Network, including in the Docket 9288 case obstruction are required under Intel’s DOJ antitrust compliance obligations.

That is for Intel and Network executive amnesty and or immunity from maximum antitrust and RICO damages. This would seem to include those associated with FTC Docket 9341.

I’d presume Intel is participating in reversing the frame and fraud associated with Docket 9288 obstruction. Alternatively in the face of a known obstruction in the administration of justice which includes witness tampering, fraudulent construction and white wash, the Docket 9341 clock could be reset to June 11, 1991.

June 11, 1991 is the inception of the Intel Insider scheme enabling a complete Intel monopoly consumer recovery.

Pursuant to Docket 9341, I am concerned that $72 billion dollars in monopolization have been calculated. And that the worldwide consumer recoverable from Intel tied charge back, and monopoly price of up to $42 billion, will be left un-recovered or left on the negotiating table in any FTC closed door Docket 9341 settlement.

Our knowing this fact of the consumer recoverable, legitimately, consumers are due their return from Intel and Network members.

The history of Intel class actions suggests any privately litigated consumer class action will be blown or settled on disproportionate values too harms.

This attorney opinion is supported by historical evaluation, including attorneys who would take the FCA, if not for their knowledge of the history of Intel Market Rigging, the various corporate political, time trap and litigation hurdles.

Intel Network adverse litigation for year’s has been sand bagged, blown, thrown and settled on minor causes with slim remedies and minor financial recovery in relation to harms. Here our countries history of private antitrust litigation ends until attorneys who would risk toughest corporate, political, legal and judicial hurdles resolves itself.

FTC and DOJ can restart that tradition of private antitrust litigation with full Intel Network disclosures, monopoly encompassing remedies and recoveries, where world wide consumer recoveries are due consumers including the Federal government.

Bursting boilers and the Federal Power, Garrison Dam Disaster and the Federal Power, Bar Pilots and the Federal Power, Finance & Securities Disaster and Federal Power, broken oil well valves and the Federal Power, broken regulatory & the Federal Power; fixing broken Intel and the Federal Power, transparently, offers the potential for one of Intel’s greatest legacies.

A cornerstone on which willing members of Bar and Bench, and corporate entities, will see and take action regulation seriously.

Lacking Bar and Bench free from corporate political network control, I fear broken regulatory will remain. A functional regulatory, Bar & Bench, are required first lines of monopoly and rackets error detection and correction.

Pursuant to FCA, I will be requesting Congress and/or President Obama please assign a Federal attorney for qui tam representation.

A case to whom I am recognized Relator and hold the U.S. Attorney recovery reward letter, having been steward for many years before and following my official Relator status.

No legitimate private attorney will take the case in the face of the market rig.

Fifth, finance and investment bankers use Quanda model, with price projection tools, to model Intel revenue and margins; like media retrospectively, to play the stock up to two years in advance.

Sixth, Intel inside individual stock traders can do the same thing as I’ve demonstrated to FTC and U.S. DOJ.

Seventh, the Intel Quanda on mass weight of use, retrospectively, extended Intel’s x86 and PC market rigs to the NASDAQ; including in relation to other exchanges.

Think about it, Intel Insider ability too play the stock of Intel and PC Dealers up to two years in advance is an extreme catalyst to rig not only individual stock prices, but the NASDAQ index itself. The Quanda was used to rig markets; Intel had DOJ 1st report responsibility.

Eight, combination and cartel proofs exist throughout Intel economic and system structural proofs. Structural proofs are easily deciphered from their component patterns and prove intent to monopolize per se. No other conduct proofs are required.

Nine, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are well aware of the Section 1 per se condemnations, Section 2 per se intent, RICO, Quanda and its reliance by Intel Network as one of their many market rigging tools.

Ten, for FTC there is no risk of Docket 9341 case loss where all Section 2 Rule of Reason claims concerning access to Intel component taper, Intel benchmark rigging, false statements to Federal procurement by Intel, Dealers and Agents concealing fraudulent and monopoly costs assessed on the Federal Government computer payment claims.

All can be heard within the bracket; Section 1 structure, Section 2 intent and RICO Proofs. Please consider one of multiple proofs below:

In the RICO proof below, find partial classic Intel Xeon Tanner and Xeon Copper mine economic analysis. Playing signaling revealed by the Quanda, savvy PC Dealers were informed to stick with the quasi static equilibrium and back eddy offered by Xeon Tanner, and to avoid being washed over the falls that is Xeon Cascades

Cascades is the Intel desktop microprocessor Copper mine 256, repackaged as a high performance Xeon server product at monopoly price premium and for dumping onto AMD.

Xeon Cascades was not a high performance product and by June 2000 main board suppliers serving the broker system market, had rejected it, causing Intel to cancel its retail boxed version of the Cascade product line.

Cascade’s was then left to sell through Intel primary Dealer channels.

Please note that AMD Opteron code names; Sledge Hammer and Claw Hammer, follow in response to Intel Network notice of Tanner signaling and pending Cascade predatory product dumping. Dumping is relied on by Intel a lot.

Strategically to stop current competitive product flows in channels or to make it unprofitable for competitors to enter that product category.

In Conclusion

Intel Network case matters are about insuring innovation production short run to short run. Preserving ability to innovate based on examples that demonstrate Intel methods of creative destruction can be very destructive economically, structurally, holistically and socially. Intel Network RICO is proven. Section 1 and Section 2 case proofs wait to be discovered by FTC or sit delivered at FTC and DOJ waiting hearing stage.

I look forward to open Intel hearings for a transparency that will educate every American on forms of domestic economic terrorism caused by illegal monopolization, combinations, cartels, frauds, theft, deceit and the cover ups that have stymied these Intel Network case matters from their complete remedies and resolutions for over a decade.

Freedom to compete in an open environment free from the undermining effects of chaotic forces is our future. A difficult task where our successful completion can become one of democratic capitalism’s greatest triumphs.

Respectfully Submitted

Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing

FBI Original Source of Intel Network RICO; 1996
FTC Invited field reporter Docket 9288, 1998-2000
CDOJ and NYDOJ first to report; 1998

CDOJ lettered to work report; Intel Section 1 Framework; 2000 –
SEC Notice; 2007
U.S. Attorney NCD recognized FCA Relator; 2008
FTC voluntary analyst Docket 9341; under Labor Code 3363.5; 2009

October 9, 2008

To:
Chairman Kovacic, Commissioners Jones Harbour, Leibowitz, Rosch
Federal Trade Commission
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580

cc: State Attorney Generals, United States Senate, Congressional Committees

Fm: Mike Bruzzone
6000 Park Avenue
Richmond, California, USA 94805

Re: Math Correction; Recoverable Intel Inside fee per computer is $13.35
Frameworks & filters supporting Intel Corp. case movement to hearing stage.

Chairman Kovacic & Commissioner Harbour, Leibowitz, Rosch:

This correspondence notifies the National Association of Attorney Generals of the math error I made this last May calculating the Intel Inside fee recoverable for consumers.

Due to the trans-position of a single decimal place my thesis public summary placed the Intel Inside accrual for Intel x86 microprocessor based ‘intra platform’ desktop computers at $0.70 to $0.97 each. Note that amount is not correct.

Correct amounts are displayed be-low and between 1993 and 2006 average $13.35 per Intel microprocessor (MPU) routed by and between Intel contractually enabled horizontal dealing combinations in inter state commerce and inter nation trade.

Intel Inside Rebated-Fee Accruals

Year Annual Coop $ ▲ Coop Yr /Yr % ▲ Coop Annual Sales Rev Coop % Rev**
MPU Shipments Yr $Coop/MPU

1993 $325,000,000 $8,872,000,000 0.0366 33,680,000 $9.65
1994 $459,000,000 $134,000,000 29.19% $11,521,000,000 0.0398 44,700,000 $10.27
1995 $654,000,000 $195,000,000 29.82% $16,202,000,000 0.0404 54,870,000 $11.92
1996 $974,000,000 $320,000,000 32.85% $20,847,000,000 0.0467 70,790,000 $13.76

1997 $1,200,000,000 $226,000,000 18.83% $25,070,000,000 0.0479 85,330,000 $14.06
1998 $1,300,000,000 $100,000,000 7.69% $26,273,000,000 0.0495 90,960,000 $14.29
1999 $1,700,000,000 $400,000,000 23.53% $29,389,000,000 0.0578 115,800,000 $14.68

2000 $2,000,000,000 $300,000,000 15.00% $33,726,000,000 0.0593 139,500,000 $14.34
2001 $1,600,000,000 -$400,000,000 -25.00% $26,539,000,000 0.0603 154,300,000 $10.37
2002 $1,700,000,000 $100,000,000 5.88% $26,764,000,000 0.0635 167,500,000 $10.15
2003 $1,800,000,000 $100,000,000 5.56% $30,141,000,000 0.0597 170,000,000 $10.59
2004 $2,100,000,000 $300,000,000 14.29% $34,209,000,000 0.0614 175,000,000 $12.00

2005 $2,600,000,000 $500,000,000 19.23% $38,826,000,000 0.0670 177,000,000 $14.69
2006 $2,300,000,000 -$300,000,000 -13.04% $35,382,000,000 0.0650 180,000,000 $12.78
2007 185,000,000
2008 190,000,000
2009

Total $20,712,000,000 $363,761,000,000 0.0581 2,034,430,000 $13.35***

** Note intent to monopolize as percentage increase over time.

* Adds 2007 Annual Coop to original October 2, 2008 NAAG submission

*** Note: Add microprocessor broker dealer matching contribution recovery value = $26.70 per Intel PC

*** Note: Add microprocessor broker dealer matching contribution recovery value = $25.50 per Intel PC
United States Senate, Congressional Committee Members pg 2

Estimation for State wide consumer recovery multiplies $12.25 for each Intel micropro-cessor sold within a computers central processing unit, within your State, beginning 1993 through to today.

To estimate a maximum recovery divide by 2, or one half of all systems sold within your State. To estimate a minimum recovery divide by 4, or ¼ of all systems sold within your State. To refine State recovery utilize the Intel annual rebated-fee accru-als table located above.

This method establishes a consumer recovery range for the Intel Inside transport fee tied to a single Intel microprocessor embedded into the consumer sales price of a single com-puter’s central processing unit (CPU). One microprocessor per CPU equals $12.25; two microprocessors per CPU is $24.50; four microprocessors per CPU = $49.00 and so on.

Note that this division should really account for the number of Intel x86 microprocessors (MPU) sold in your State, as some Intel computers contain more than one MPU per CPU. Simple division by the number of Intel based computers (CPU) sold within your State, re-gardless of the number of Intel microprocessors (MPU) they contain, is meant to simplify the consumer recovery estimation.

This Intel Inside commission fee pays PC and other media to sell specific Intel Dealer PC brand models that are tied to the majority of Intel’s commercial microprocessor transport fund. This fund is accrued by Intel intra platform Computer Dealers purchasing Intel x86 microprocessors in excess of their associated computer brand model’s end user sales de-mand; solely to strip & mass the transport incentive.

Stripping fees accrued from overage creates the weighted attractor which both ties and enlists the media to sell specific Intel Dealer computer brand models, from which the majority of the transport fund was obtain-ed, regardless of whether or not any specific computer contains the Intel microprocessor rebate from which the fee was massed.

That is because, frequently, any specific comput-er’s microprocessor transport charge was in fact skimmed from another Intel microproces-sor purchased by that computer Dealer as overage and resold to another microprocessor broker or PC system integrator sans the fee.

This act of Intel intra platform PC Dealers over purchasing to mass the media transport incentive from the total available funds from anyone Intel microprocessor production run is meant to artificially weight and build Dealer transport pools, administered and paid out by Intel, between Intel Computer Dealers tied and routed through their Media Sales Channel counterparts.

In this three step distribution structure juxtaposing dealing combinations, Intel Computer Dealers represent a bridge channel entry point and Intel Media Sales outlets represent the channel exit point.

Not all media commission fees massed from anyone Intel microprocessor production run pass through with computer brand model sales associated with that MPU production run.

A lag effect occurs as media clears fee pools secured in excess of anyone Computer Deal-er’s end system sales. As an example microprocessor fees stripped from Pentium III over-age in excess of associated dealer PIII computer sales may not be cleared by media until
their Pentium 4 sales push, which now focuses on that same PC Dealer’s Pentium 4 brand models based on the effect from prior products.

This lag effect is continuous across Pen-tium, Pentium II, Pentium III, Pentium 4, Core Duo; & Quad Core system sales? That is United States Senate, Congressional Committee Members pg 3

why the Intel Inside scheme limits computers containing competitive microprocessors;
substitutes & replacements in real time and in future time. Whether AMD, NexGen, Cyrix, National, IDT/Centaur, Rise, Transmeta, VIA, and in x86 Windows platform replacment market DEC, MIPS, Motorola, and in the enterprise replacement platform markets Sun, IBM and Hewlett Packard. Limiting structure this way restrains competitive innovation’s ability to grow in size in both the hardware platform and operating system markets.

Structurally, establishing the consumer recovery range dividing by 2 and 4, breaks out computers which sold through with the rebate as a traditional cooperative advertising al-lowance, verse all other systems, sold through by media based on the skewed weight of fee pools secured from overage as a transport incentive.

Prior correspondences describe this system structure which is the Intel Inside rebate-fee scheme juxtaposing horizontal dealing combinations; based on explicit contract in the service of Intel Corporation.

In essence a market allocation scheme in which media throttles specific computer brand model sales to accelerate the clearing of skewed and weighted Dealer fee pools. Strategically this include-es media organizing themselves as domestic cartel’s of coordinated sister publications with interlocking executive directorate, to broaden their skim for the fee.

Using this method for determining consumer recovery; based on Intel financials, produc-tion estimates, knowledge of the Intel Inside fee metric, computer dealer annual sales vis Intel output, this analyst has estimated consumer recovery of the hidden media transport commission fee at between $5 billion & $11 billion worldwide. At topic currently is the nation who will take judicial leadership in recovery & distribution of consumer recovery.

Analysis for movement to hearing stage:

Following, multiple filters and frameworks are explored for moving the Intel case matters to hearing stage. Filters include review of three prior for moving a Sherman Act true pos- itive to hearing; Easterbrook, Calvani filters & monopoly share.

In this correspondence the analyst will expand on monopoly share using 9th Circuit filter considering Intel in input and output markets. Examination will conclude with MCI test, no economic sense & profit sacrifice test, Areeda-Turner below cost price test on Pentium III shrink data set, predator price test, elasticity example, efficient components price & general universal test.

Intel Rebate-Fee Scheme is Section 1 Contract, Combination,
Conspiracy to Restrain:

First and foremost Intel competition violations are Sherman Act Section 1 per se condem-nations of law. Subsequently no other tests are required as Intel anticompetitive conduct, systems, structure and environmental factors; such as the transport fee scheme, existence of multiple horizontal dealing combinations and cartels, can be assessed through Section 1 rule of reason on existing case precedence. Over nine competition cases support that the Intel Inside commission fee is, and always has been, illegal.

Section 1 multilateral industry analysis does in fact prove Section 2 unilateral claims. For example, Intel intent to monopolize can be seen in percent increase of the Intel Inside re-
United States Senate, Congressional Committee Members pg 4

rebated-fees accrued to horizontal Dealers between 1993 & 2006. Note that increases in the
Intel Inside master fund are on the books monies. There are in addition off the book’s al-legations.

Noteworthy is that this Intel investigation began in 1992 with conduct sightings including knowledge of the Intel Inside scheme; by 1995 seen through repeating pattern in the work
field, in 1996 moved to FBI report and assessment of why the intent, in 1996, 1997, 1998 attracted opposition which built through 2005, in 1999 identified structural attributes first by case precedence, confirmed by systems structures and validated by industrial manage-ment and economics.

Since 1999 this case brief has been constantly refined by this anal-yst. I anticipate exponential discoveries from this foundation analysis given government investigative and analytic resource’s much greater than my own.

Section 2 analysis:

Inherently, then, assessment of the Intel case matters through Section 2 methods is dup-licative if not after the fact. However it seemed like a fun exercise and supports this an-alyst’s work identifying what I have described as a matrix combination.

An x:y matrix of interconnected cells; a racket, in which Intel x86 intra platform computers are routed ver-tically in inter state commerce and inter nation trade.

With the vertical route formations formed by first establishing the cross tying of horizontal dealing combinations. In other words multilateral conduct is required to lead the many unilateral routing effects.

These effects between Intel enabled multilateral channel entry and exit points, made it possible to sandwich together 27 adjacent laterals of x86 computer industry, channel and market structure to form the matrix combination.

A matrix of cells which limit, guard and accel-erate Intel values moving down channels within the horizontal field effects of many ver-tical bridges established by multilateral entry and exit points. In this sandwich formation security dealers, for one, are caught in the middle of the juxtaposing combination’s trans-port effects.

Frameworks & Filters for movement to hearing stage:

Note the following lenses weighing forward movement to hearing include this analyst’s evolutionary refinements.

Calvani Filter:

1) Is the restraint inherently suspect yes
restrict competition yes
raises price by percent of fee
decreases output increases throughput of
Intel output tied to fee

2) Is there a plausible efficiency justification;
enhanced competition no
reducing cost no stimulates Intel surplus sell thru w/charge yes
United States Senate, Congressional Committee Members pg 5

Easterbrook Filter:

1) Does defendant hold market power 81.47% x86 CPU market share.
majority of the value stream

2) Does defendant have an incentive; yes
to behave in an anticompetitive way yes
are sanctions necessary to correct yes
conduct remedies yes
structure remedies yes
environment remedies yes
criminal remedies yes
remedies understood in advance of hearing yes
potential methods of over sight regulation yes

3) Competitors use different;
production methods yes and no
distribution methods yes and no

4) Output reduced by challenged parties through time

5) Sales of challenged parties restrained yes

6) Identity of plaintiff; rival the same horizontal competitors
vertical rivals
Inputs Market Power:

1) PC x86 microprocessors Intel 81.47% x86 mkt share

2) industry vertical components taper Intel x86 CPU, embedded memories, chip set, graphics processor, main board, storage sub systems.

3) horizontal dealing combination lateral of MPU resellers

4) supply schedule bottleneck yes
has Intel provided justification for bottleneck no

5) likeness to see (supply schedule) leap frog competition no
likeness to see platform innovation leads demonstrated leadership
by Intel competitors & rivals

6) IP theft of competitive innovations by Intel yes

7) Intel durable monopoly power in inputs market yes
United States Senate, Congressional Committee Members pg 6

Outputs Market Power:

1) PC x86 microprocessors Intel 81.47% x86 mkt share
majority Dealer share

2) vertical distribution routes yes

3) horizontal dealing combinations lateral of PC Dealers trans- porting product tied through 2nd lateral of media sales outlets.

4) bottleneck in commercial channels of distribution - yes
has Intel provided justification for bottleneck no

5) Intel durable monopoly power in outputs market yes

Ninth Circuit Filter:

1) relevant market monopoly share yes; 81.47% x86 mkt share

2) significant barriers to entry yes

4) limiting behavior in the relevant market(s) yes

3) barriers preventing competitors from
increasing short run production capacity yes

5) entrant/competitor production capacity to take
business away from incumbent monopolist no

6) entrant/competitor ability to take business
away from incumbent monopolist short run
to short run for long run gain not demonstrated
dysfunctional oligopoly
MCI Test:

1) Intel as a monopolist
Market share 81.47% x86 MPU mkt share
Durable monopolist inputs/output markets yes
Abusive monopolist 9th Circuit Court filter yes

2a) Can others duplicate essential facilities:
input market component taper AMD has near duplicated
output market transport bridge no; Section 1 illegal
United States Senate, Congressional Committee Members pg 7

MCI Test:

2b)Co-op program possible w/legal pass thru yes
for horizontal competitors 18.53% insufficient capacity
competitors defray Intel fee cost w/lower CPU price yes, has been done
competitor parity rebating Intel fee in low CPU price no; lowers competitor total revenue, reduces natural trickle down revenue levels to channels, lacks MPU tie to media layer.

3) Monopolist Combine denies access Network access for Intel
CPUs charged with MPU transport effect before all other natural values.

4) Is the facility available to competitors
component taper within inputs market yes, possibly
distribution bridge within outputs market no

5) Intel engineering reasons for essential facilities;
input market platform component taper platform definition
platform leadership bundling @ price < s4 =" MC" mr =" D4" mr =" D4">the Intel Neptune mother board bundle.

This Intel bundle included Pentium microprocessor, chip set, motherboard, Intel subsidized memor-ies.

In 1995 I investigated why Nx586 platform sales obstacle in the North East region. That obstacle was in fact an industry wide obstacle where Intel’s Neptune mother board bundle was offered by Intel at a low price to supply the same components at or below ri-val cost; all tied to the Intel Inside fee scheme. There are newer input examples & others would be more aware. General universal test:

Beyond the question of component bundles, back to key considerations for moving Intel case matters to hearing stage for input and output market monopolization:

1) Input market practices tend to eliminate competition? yes
2) Dealers tend to focus more on the monopoly supplier? yes

Supplier practices tend to deny competitive access? yes
3) Output market practices tend to eliminate competition? yes

Practices raise costs, make competitors less effective? yes
4) Intel network effects tend to eliminate competition? yes
5) Contract for horizontal combination? yes

6) Cartels as subsets of combination? yes
7) Economic justification for input & output practices are
reasons enough to outweigh anticompetitive effects? no

Respectfully Submitted,
Mike Bruzzone
Intel Case Technical Analysis since 1996 "

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eMail me Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
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Proof Intel Corp. is a Cartel.
Proof of RICO Violations - Intel Corp.
Proof of Intel Violating the Sherman Act...

Only Questions which Judges, Attorneys, State Bars, Ethics Committees and Other Corrupt SEC, Dept. of Justice and others helped Intel to Commist Massive Shareholder Fraud Over Decades..

More on the Intel Mafia at
www.CEOpaulOtelleni.com
www.BruceSewell.com