A Bit on the importance of an IMPARTIAL Judge

"According to, Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, Second Edition,
Charles Gardner Geyh, Associate Dean of Research, John F. Kimberling Professor of
Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, a Federal Judicial Center Publication;

"For centuries, impartiality has been a defining feature of the Anglo-American judge’s role in the
administration of justice. 

The reason is clear: in a constitutional order grounded in the rule of law, it is imperative that judges make decisions according to law, unclouded by personal bias or conflicts of interest.

Accordingly, upon ascending the bench, every federal judge takes an oath to
“faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties” of judicial office; and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been
construed to guarantee litigants the right to a “neutral and detached,” or impartial, judge.

Moreover, in a democratic republic in which the legitimacy of government depends on the
consent and approval of the governed, public confidence in the administration of justice is
indispensable. 

It is not enough that judges be impartial; the public must perceive them to be so.

The Code of Conduct for United States Judges therefore admonishes judges to “act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”
and to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities"

"When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is to disqualify that judge
from hearing further proceedings in the matter.

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a case concerning disqualification of a state supreme court justice, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigants have a due process right to an impartial judge, and that under circumstances in which judicial bias was probable, due process required disqualification. The Court noted, however, that disqualification rules may be and often are more rigorous than the Due Process Clause requires.

So it is with disqualification requirements for federal judges, which require disqualification when a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned."

Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455

A. Overview

1. The text of § 455 The primary source of disqualification law in the federal judicial system is 28
U.S.C. § 455. It provides, in its entirety, as follows:

§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or
such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in
controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding.

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a
reasonable effort to inform himself about the
personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in
his household. 10 Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law

(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases
shall have the meaning indicated:

(1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other
stages of litigation;

(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;

(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;
(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a
relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the
judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a
“financial interest” in securities held by the organization;

(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a
mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the
organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
interest;

(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest”

in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the

securities.

(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to

the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in

subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under

subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full

disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.

(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate

judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after

substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or

discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a

fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial

interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome),

disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or

minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the

grounds for the disqualification.

Sections (a) and (b) occupy the core of § 455 and should be read

together. The two sections divide the universe of disqualification into

two halves: the general, catch-all category of § 455(a), which requires

disqualification from any proceeding in which a judge’s “impartiality

might reasonably be questioned”; and a list of more specific grounds

for disqualification in § (b).

The remainder of § 455 is directed at implementing §§ (a) and (b):

• Section (c) admonishes judges to keep abreast of their financial

interests to ensure that they know when to disqualify themselves under § 455(b)(4).

• Section (d) defines terms employed in §§ (a) and (b).

• Section (e) provides parties with a limited opportunity to waive

disqualification otherwise required by the catch-all § (a)—

typically where the judge is poised to disqualify himself or herself sua sponte—but does not

permit the parties to waive disqualification required by the more specific provisions of § (b).

• Section (f) provides a limited opportunity for judges to avoid

the need to disqualify themselves for financial interest under

§ (b)(4) through divestiture.

2. Interpretive ground rules

a. Interpreting § 455(a) in relation to § 455(b)

As embodied in § 455, §§ (a) and (b) are conceptually separate.

Section (a) compels disqualification for the appearance of partiality, while

§ (b) “also” compels disqualification for bias, financial interest, and

other specific grounds. In contrast, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct—after which § 455 was

originally modeled—and the current Code of Conduct for United States Judges unify the two

halves conceptually by characterizing the specific grounds for disqualification as a nonexclusive

subset of circumstances in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

 For the most part, this may be a distinction without a difference—disqualification is required if

the specific or general provisions are triggered, regardless of whether the specific provisions are

characterized as a subset of or separate from the general.

On the other hand, by onceptualizing them separately, § 455 can require disqualification under specific circumstances enumerated in § (b) that might not reasonably be characterized as calling a judge’s impartiality into question under § (a). For example, § (b)(4) requires judges to disqualify themselves for financial interest

“however small,” which necessarily includes an interest so small that it could not reasonably call the judge’s impartiality into question.

Any circumstance in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under §

(a) requires disqualification, even if the circumstance is not enumerated in § 455(b).

 At the same time, when § 455(b) identifies a particular situation requiring disqualification, it will

tend to control any § 455

(a) analysis with respect to that specific situation. For example, §455(b)(5) requires disqualification when one of the parties is within the third degree of relationship to the judge. Consequently, a fourth-degree relationship to a party does not by itself create an appearance of partiality requiring disqualification under § 455(a)— although disqualification under § 455(a) might still be appropriate if, for example, the judge’s

personal relationship with the fourth-degree relative was so close as to call the judge’s impartiality into question. As the Supreme Court explained, “[s]ection 455(b)(5), which addresses

the matter of relationship specifically, ends the disability at the thirddegree of relationship, and

that should obviously govern for purposes of § 455(a) as well.”

The 1974 amendments to § 455, however, shifted the balance by requiring disqualification whenever a judge’s impartiality “might” reasonably be questioned, and the legislative history made clear that in revising the statute, Congress sought to end the “duty to sit".

“When Congress amended § 455(a), it made clear that judges should apply an objective

standard in determining whether to disqualify. A judge contemplating disqualification under §

455(a), then, should not ask whether he or she believes he or she is capable of impartially

presiding over the case.

 Rather, the question is whether a judge’s impartiality might be questioned from the perspective of a reasonable person,and every circuit has adopted some version of the “reasonable person” standard to answer this question.

 In the context of denying a motion for his disqualification from Cheney v. United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, Justice Scalia noted that this reasonable person is aware “of

all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” The Second Circuit has characterized the

reasonable person as an “objective, disinterested observer” who is privy to full knowledge of the

surrounding circumstances.”

...

“The question has sometimes arisen as to whether the standard for disqualification differs in a

bench trial where the judge’s role is even more pivotal than in a jury trial. In Alexander v.

Primerica Holdings, Inc., the court of appeals said: “We cannot overlook the fact that this is a

non-jury case, and that [the judge] will be deciding each and every substantive issue at trial . . . .

When the judge is the actual trier of fact, the need to presserve the appearance of impartiality is

especially pronounced”

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455, and upon examination of the record, I, Personally believe that Judge Martin Colin is NOT impartial and is violating the constitutional and lawful rights of the victims in this case.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/455