"Novermber 8, 2010; Nations Interest Publication release 3.2, now with fifteen monopoly examples and Intel Corporation source Attorney on DOJ and FTC antitrust compliance obligations
Entire Official Report was Sent to and Ignored By:
FTC Inspector General
FTC Inspector General
FTC Commissioners
SEC Commissioner
Senate & Congress
State Attorney Generals
United States Attorneys
Director Robert Mueller, FBI
Honorable Eric Holder, DOJ
Vice President Joseph Biden
""
Where, perhaps, State Attorney Generals should be able to initiateand oversee cases within FTC for spot control across the country.
What Does the Intel Board of Directors have to Say about This Blatant Violation of State and Federal Laws, and this Massive Shareholder and Consumer Fraud.
Re: Intel Corporation Competition Case Update
- FTC Investigator Notice of Fiduciary Failure in Docket 9341
- Added pointers calculating 9341 consumer monopoly overcharge
- Lettered Relator Seeks Attorney; FCA, 31 USC 3279, recovery of monopoly & fraudulent cost imposed on Federal Government’s Intel based PC purchases.
“If the preoccupation of its official is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal
opportunity but is to be barter in the markets that is not liberalism, it is degeneration”.
President Herbert Hoover
FTC Inspector General, Senate, Congress, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys, FTC & SEC Commissioners, Director Mueller, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, DOJ Antitrust, DOJ Cartel Divisions and Vice President Joseph Biden:
On non address of up to $48.735 billion# consumer recoverable and no antitrust remedies associated with FTC v Intel Corporation Docket 9341 consent order, please find analyst comment on reorganizing Federal Trade Commission toward financial self sufficiency, pros and cons of Section 5 for competitive case investigation, summation of Intel Inside tied charge back, fifteen Intel microprocessor production examples on which 9341 Intel consumer recovery estimates are calculated.
Consumer Monopoly Overcharge
Similar to prior Intel production examples 9341 consumer recovery pointers document monopoly overcharge in Docket 9288 and 9341 review periods. Herein fifteen examples 1995 through 2003 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC vs. Intel Docket 9288. That cause is Intel intent to monopolize markets for the next decade actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation Cartel.
A cartel composed of Intel, PC Dealers, Media Sales Agents, investment banking, security operatives, corporate political relations and network confidence agents embedded by Intel, Media Sales Agents, and likely foreign Nation’s interest, into domestic x86 competitors to steal from and dismantle competition.
A cartel composed of Intel, PC Dealers, Media Sales Agents, investment banking, security operatives, corporate political relations and network confidence agents embedded by Intel, Media Sales Agents, and likely foreign Nation’s interest, into domestic x86 competitors to steal from and dismantle competition.
A network of extended relation’s who long time conceal Intel vertical by horizontal matrix of integrated dealing cells streaming intra platform computers to end buyers in system field effects. Where Federal authority in position to resolve systematic economic crime, have not, raising the question of blocker or detractor?
Nothing in Docket 9341 consent order addresses these facts, continued Nations, society harms and consumer financial recoveries form this history of anticompetitive system’s conduct, racketeering, industrial and economic espionages. An environment understood by industry players for nearly two decades. And many in government authority who seem to sit on the side lines? In fact the extent of those in DC with knowledge of the high level espionage and enterprise network corruption case investigations is really quite extensive.
Nothing in Docket 9341 consent order addresses these facts, continued Nations, society harms and consumer financial recoveries form this history of anticompetitive system’s conduct, racketeering, industrial and economic espionages. An environment understood by industry players for nearly two decades. And many in government authority who seem to sit on the side lines? In fact the extent of those in DC with knowledge of the high level espionage and enterprise network corruption case investigations is really quite extensive.
“If such combinations be not destroyed all the advantages which would naturally come to
the public operating under the general laws of competition, will be lost, and the entire
commerce of an immense territory will be at the mercy of a single holding company.”
Justice Harlan Stone
All aspects of Intel monopolization beyond commercial fraud remain deleted from Docket 9341 consent order as accepted by FTC Commissioner’s on November 1. Resulting in this third Federal example of Intel Corporation dodging competition, racketeering and espionage violations pursuant to three investigative tracks that also validate Federal agency failures to regulate competition, racketeering, cross enterprise, cross profession network crime including in progress economic espionages; DOJ v Intel 1991 – 1993, FTC v Intel Docket 9288 1998 – 2001, FTC v Intel Docket 9341 2009-2010.
How is one to explain the result of this continuous compounded series of misfeasance and failures in oversight control across Intel case matters for nearly two decades?
FTC Reorganization
On two of three Intel case anomalies this analyst suggests the Federal Trade Commission should be reconfigured for financial self sufficiency. Up to $48.735 billion and antitrust remedies is a lot of funding to leave off the table.
Too earn its keep can FTC be reconfigured to lead virtual competition case actions? Like any private plaintiff attorney partnership paid for monitoring, regulation, investigation, leading case work for competitive recovery from the very corporations the agency is suppose to regulate under Sherman and Clayton Acts. Too modernize an agency held captive by the political agenda of corporate legal guild in relation to employment and professional placements beyond the agency itself. Including where corporate political and institutional influences are often responsible for making and sustaining employment placements in those agency’s in question.
Obviously not a fault of the institution or its Congressional Charter but of society and the personal boundaries of individual actor’s responsible for implementing and overseeing that charter. And where there are questions of oversight control perhaps State Attorney Generals should be included as added check under FTC Congressional charter? Certainly more desirable than this False Claim’s Act Relator.
Obviously not a fault of the institution or its Congressional Charter but of society and the personal boundaries of individual actor’s responsible for implementing and overseeing that charter. And where there are questions of oversight control perhaps State Attorney Generals should be included as added check under FTC Congressional charter? Certainly more desirable than this False Claim’s Act Relator.
Where, perhaps, State Attorney Generals should be able to initiateand oversee cases within FTC for spot control across the country.
Who’s been minding shop in DC? Where Intel case matters are concerned why are the continued symptoms of regulatory, oversight, corporate law enforcement and attorney fiduciary dysfunction so pronounced and for so long?
In the face of Intel Network again demonstrating administration of corporate and attorney fraternal ties that are greater than the Federal Power itself, making FTC financially self sufficient is designed to increase competitive effectiveness, to cut corporate ties, earn its keep under Charter on the very recoveries FTC is supposed to be delivering. No different from Relator under False Claims Act. Why shouldn’t FTC be rewarded operating returns on antitrust and commerce case recoveries?
In doing so like any partnership offer an incentive to federal employees on that return, under the Federal Power, which would surely keep FTC focused on the high value cases. With of course some ratio of funding for all other types of matters that require attention. Delivering on the administrative front a lean organization in step with its ability to self sustain organically. To counter corporate guild control it just might take a separate stronger independent public partnership.
On FTC case review under Section 5 of Antitrust Act
Having participated in two Section 5 investigations of Intel competitive practices; Dockets 9288 directly with FTC investigating attorney Mr. Lin, 9341 through attorney team liaisons Ms. Espeldon, Ms. Kransky and Mr. Cox, this analyst’s stated view has been that Section 5 offers an all encompassing umbrella to research, discover, validate Intel Network program and practices that harm competition and consumers.
Providing broad vantage to detect and calculate the costs of Sherman and Clayton Act violations on enterprises, industries, consumers, society and Nations.
Providing broad vantage to detect and calculate the costs of Sherman and Clayton Act violations on enterprises, industries, consumers, society and Nations.
For 9341 perhaps Section 5 should not be considered an unusual first approach to research and validate antitrust claims and harms.
Two decades of Intel Network concealing and misrepresenting harms and costs on competition and consumers requires a broad approach to systematically filter from superset too subset for stringent structural proofs.
Pointers and proofs decomposed from a monopoly broth relied on to conceal and divert from active system, structure and economic findings, error detection and correction through three Federal investigations, that is Intel Network monopolization for much too long.
Two decades of Intel Network concealing and misrepresenting harms and costs on competition and consumers requires a broad approach to systematically filter from superset too subset for stringent structural proofs.
Pointers and proofs decomposed from a monopoly broth relied on to conceal and divert from active system, structure and economic findings, error detection and correction through three Federal investigations, that is Intel Network monopolization for much too long.
Favorably Section 5 has revealed a springboard too evolve Section 2 case precedent concerning industry competitive effects claimed to cause competitor harms that may also be competition and consumer harms. Where Section 5 investigation has filled a gap in antitrust enforcement revealing a Section 1 path too hear on industry competitive claims.
Claims that are industry causes within system, structure and economic proofs of competition and consumer harms under Sherman, Clayton Acts, commerce and racketeering laws.
This path to remedy industry claims through Section 1 affirmative findings offers a bracket too review and evolve Section 2 case precedent for industry competitors.
Claims that are industry causes within system, structure and economic proofs of competition and consumer harms under Sherman, Clayton Acts, commerce and racketeering laws.
This path to remedy industry claims through Section 1 affirmative findings offers a bracket too review and evolve Section 2 case precedent for industry competitors.
Long time industry claims are worth judicial review within the bracket of established antitrust, commerce and racketeering case precedent. On this strategy the total case cannot be lost; only won. Where it’s more important than ever for Commission too actively exercise its full Congressional authority under Section 5 judicial hearing.
Two decades of Intel Network concealing espionage that is intended to monopolize multiple industries and markets through corporate political multipoint manipulation of Federal, State, and inter nation authority by organized network crime cannot be left unresolved.
Two decades of Intel Network concealing espionage that is intended to monopolize multiple industries and markets through corporate political multipoint manipulation of Federal, State, and inter nation authority by organized network crime cannot be left unresolved.
Anyone in DC who continues along non address of antitrust, criminal and commercial frauds should be questioned. And if incapable of doing this job for fear of what Intel Network will do to you and your family as done to mine find someone capable to do that job. Mr. Holder, Mr. Mueller, Ms. Varney please place individuals into these positions who will do the job. No more varnishing over eighteen years of a compounding misfeasance.
The FTC has shown itself hampered in monitoring, regulating, remedying Intel corporate crime network. The U.S. DOJ through its inaction is suspect of similar.
The FBI informed of Intel marketing Media Agent spy ring over a decade ago and there are still no arrests? While these known individuals have buried themselves deeper into strategic influence positions within technology industry, media and society.
One has to ask why and what’s the next step toward reorganizing Federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies for competition espionage and cartel case effectiveness for industry, public and nation good.
The FBI informed of Intel marketing Media Agent spy ring over a decade ago and there are still no arrests? While these known individuals have buried themselves deeper into strategic influence positions within technology industry, media and society.
One has to ask why and what’s the next step toward reorganizing Federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies for competition espionage and cartel case effectiveness for industry, public and nation good.
Everyone close to these case matters knows the real Intel; society damaging enabler of cross enterprise, cross profession organized network crime.
Demonstrating debilitating affects on society Intel Corporate Political Network must be reformed to achieve any rational level of enterprise, industry and competition reform. Docket 9341 consent order fails to state any antitrust remedies.
This analyst believes Docket 9341 consent order will be ineffective on sole address of industry commercial frauds and futile to administer from antitrust conduct left unaddressed. Apparently not to be monitored under the order?
Demonstrating debilitating affects on society Intel Corporate Political Network must be reformed to achieve any rational level of enterprise, industry and competition reform. Docket 9341 consent order fails to state any antitrust remedies.
This analyst believes Docket 9341 consent order will be ineffective on sole address of industry commercial frauds and futile to administer from antitrust conduct left unaddressed. Apparently not to be monitored under the order?
Under 9341 consent order, provision for Intel internal monitors of the order’s provisional frameworks has been established by the FTC.
However, ironically, the very act of compliance monitors identifying out of bounds anti competitive practices, and pressing Intel for correction, can be reversed too Intel’s advantage under the order. Typical of Intel style a provision within the order enables compliance monitor’s to be dismissed by Intel for monitoring anticompetitive compliance beyond the order itself.
This loop hole in compliance monitoring is significant and places monitors under Intel control. And other than for compliance monitors who are Intel Network placements presents a loosing proposition for any credible monitor.
Citing antitrust compliance boundaries Intel remains unable to comprehend the basis of market barriers of there own network creation.
However, ironically, the very act of compliance monitors identifying out of bounds anti competitive practices, and pressing Intel for correction, can be reversed too Intel’s advantage under the order. Typical of Intel style a provision within the order enables compliance monitor’s to be dismissed by Intel for monitoring anticompetitive compliance beyond the order itself.
This loop hole in compliance monitoring is significant and places monitors under Intel control. And other than for compliance monitors who are Intel Network placements presents a loosing proposition for any credible monitor.
Citing antitrust compliance boundaries Intel remains unable to comprehend the basis of market barriers of there own network creation.
Intel Corp. Compliance Position according to Intel source Attorney December 22, 2010
1) Boundaries of antitrust compliance obligations do not require Intel Antitrust Compliance Committee to address outside the organization itself, a) monitoring internal external relations associated with contract negotiations or sales agreements, b) addressing outside parties notice of current or ongoing antitrust and criminal violations to Intel’s attention.
2) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require policing for internal crime, including error correcting subgroup crime within organization to conceal antitrust, ongoing and lingering criminal violations.
3) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require focus on externalities as the catalyst for fraud and concealment of fraud to propagate antitrust and criminal violations.
4) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require policing the Intel legal department, or any department, for operation of sub groups engaged in network crime.
5) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require addressing claims of parties afflicted by Intel commercial frauds, antitrust violations including where Intel employee and contractor obstructions are designed to mask antitrust and other crime violations by internal and external co-relations.
Where Intel presents a lot of excuse’s not to regulate for antitrust compliance. And that is because Intel cannot demonstrate management consent to regulate anticompetitive conduct or organized network crime within and proximate to that enterprise.
Academic Attorney Position on FTC v Intel Docket 9341
Some academic attorneys suggest fault in FTC Section 5 to convene an investigation to find proofs of unfair methods of industry competition and deceptive practices that may not fit judicial interpretation within the range of established consumer antitrust cases. I acknowledge the criticism and FTC should have better prepared their complaint.
And stated so before the complaint was filed. That is to state specific Clayton Act and Sherman Act Violations harming consumers under Anti Trust Section 5 authority in the face of Judiciary up front. At the time a Section 1 focus.
Were I suggest FTC key mistake following blindly parallel actions which contain built in faults ahead of 9341 research opening up the 9288 affirmative discovery paths.
All the while FTC remained surrounded within the traditional confines of an Intel invented reality of no foul driven by Intel long time network manipulation intended to keep it that way.
And stated so before the complaint was filed. That is to state specific Clayton Act and Sherman Act Violations harming consumers under Anti Trust Section 5 authority in the face of Judiciary up front. At the time a Section 1 focus.
Were I suggest FTC key mistake following blindly parallel actions which contain built in faults ahead of 9341 research opening up the 9288 affirmative discovery paths.
All the while FTC remained surrounded within the traditional confines of an Intel invented reality of no foul driven by Intel long time network manipulation intended to keep it that way.
Noteworthy Docket 9341, similar to Docket 9288 Section 5 investigation again deflects from channel causes that are antitrust true positives, to industrial causes that may or may not fit judicial interpretation as competition and consumer antitrust harms.
Plaintiff causes repositioned by media to deflect from Intel Dealer and Media Sales Agent tied channel monopolization known too harm competition and consumers. Including tactics per se condemned by theSherman and Clayton Acts that is price fixed product routing and structured market rigging, deflected toward the litigation trap of whether industrial harms harm consumers.
Where case focus is deflected in this fashion, directed away from known antitrust violations toward industry harms that might fit as competition and consumer harms, Section 5 questions are raised.
Plaintiff causes repositioned by media to deflect from Intel Dealer and Media Sales Agent tied channel monopolization known too harm competition and consumers. Including tactics per se condemned by theSherman and Clayton Acts that is price fixed product routing and structured market rigging, deflected toward the litigation trap of whether industrial harms harm consumers.
Where case focus is deflected in this fashion, directed away from known antitrust violations toward industry harms that might fit as competition and consumer harms, Section 5 questions are raised.
This analyst would like to propose a corporate political concern with FTC reliance on Section 5. A transparency concern that Section 5 is being used to mask competition espionage and the crime syndicates responsible for concealing them. And discovery rules which grant Intel advance notice on what evidence to destroy or alter.
And while there are multiple discovery cross checks to determine if Intel has destroyed or altered evidence, wouldn’t it be more effective to obtain a warrant on pointers and proofs, raid Intel, PC Dealers and Media Sales Agents, capture suspect and supporting documents and subsequently conceal discovery focus until the refined complaint is filed and criminal prosecution paths determined.
And while there are multiple discovery cross checks to determine if Intel has destroyed or altered evidence, wouldn’t it be more effective to obtain a warrant on pointers and proofs, raid Intel, PC Dealers and Media Sales Agents, capture suspect and supporting documents and subsequently conceal discovery focus until the refined complaint is filed and criminal prosecution paths determined.
For a RICO case confronting the largest most financially destructive inter nation cartel in the history of modern business why would there be any other way? Perhaps this is not the FTC’s fault in poking around with their Section 5 action but indicative of drag within the U.S. DOJ Antitrust and Cartel Divisions not stepping up to the plaintiffs desk sooner?
And FBI, where a problem in the San Francisco Bureau has been known for over a decade where Washington including the Director himself has always been copied on the complete case investigation as it progressed. Continued inaction in the case is a telling indicator of continued dysfunctional governance.
Network manipulation of FTC Section 5 inquiry has twice now confused and misinformed academics, attorneys, influencing observers, Congress and Senate affecting working views from information withheld.
Has stymied DOJ, FTC, industry plaintiff case outcomes and how many others?
By Intel Network deflecting commercial harm of their tied Dealer channel toward industry claims of harm that may or may not fit judicial interpretation of competition and consumer harms. The history of Intel investigation under 9341 & 9288 Section 5 has made government appear ineffective.
Has stymied DOJ, FTC, industry plaintiff case outcomes and how many others?
By Intel Network deflecting commercial harm of their tied Dealer channel toward industry claims of harm that may or may not fit judicial interpretation of competition and consumer harms. The history of Intel investigation under 9341 & 9288 Section 5 has made government appear ineffective.
On 9341 repeated result of 9288; encompassing voids in overall remedies, Section 5 method again falls short by failing to tell the whole story.
Similar to 9288 system, structure and economic violations that prove intent to monopolize have been left out of 9341 consent order. In doing so refocus on industry competitor conduct has caused confusion that Intel competitor harms may not be competitive antitrust and consumer harms.
Obviously the most efficient way to address any litigation is facts on focused claims. I suggest ambiguity the downfall of Section 5 method in relation to a laser beam focus to hear Sherman and Clayton Act violations from the start. Supporting secondary focus on industry commercial frauds that are competitor harms for their determination by the court as competition and consumer harms.
Similar to 9288 system, structure and economic violations that prove intent to monopolize have been left out of 9341 consent order. In doing so refocus on industry competitor conduct has caused confusion that Intel competitor harms may not be competitive antitrust and consumer harms.
Obviously the most efficient way to address any litigation is facts on focused claims. I suggest ambiguity the downfall of Section 5 method in relation to a laser beam focus to hear Sherman and Clayton Act violations from the start. Supporting secondary focus on industry commercial frauds that are competitor harms for their determination by the court as competition and consumer harms.
This upfront approach of discovery raid followed by complaint and criminal prosecution addresses criticism for FTC action out of the pubic and judicial oversight where a new layer of FTC law may now be added under established law.
Perhaps too establish a layer of guild law under Federal competition law? Or reaffirm Intel law above the Federal Power and Nation’s law?
FTC, DOJ, U.S. Attorneys and State Attorney Generals supporting judicial review to determine whether competitor harms are also competition and consumer harms would undo these concerns. With Section 1 focus removes the question of chasing down Intel on false positives. And makes FTC and DOJ leader’s in supporting virtual private law satellites by detailing known discovery paths to affirmative antitrust true positives, opposed to negatives, supporting plaintiff actions including consumer actions.
Perhaps too establish a layer of guild law under Federal competition law? Or reaffirm Intel law above the Federal Power and Nation’s law?
FTC, DOJ, U.S. Attorneys and State Attorney Generals supporting judicial review to determine whether competitor harms are also competition and consumer harms would undo these concerns. With Section 1 focus removes the question of chasing down Intel on false positives. And makes FTC and DOJ leader’s in supporting virtual private law satellites by detailing known discovery paths to affirmative antitrust true positives, opposed to negatives, supporting plaintiff actions including consumer actions.
For Docket 9288 and 9341 the core violation has always been contract, combination and conspiracy in an enterprise network fraud to conceal theSherman Act Section 1 violation. A long time antitrust violation established on case precedent validated by established Clayton Act and RICO cases.
This Section 1 violation has always been intended by Intel Combination and Cartel practice to monopolize markets maximizing their combined system economic benefit. Too limit and steal from competitors and manipulate consumers.""
This Section 1 violation has always been intended by Intel Combination and Cartel practice to monopolize markets maximizing their combined system economic benefit. Too limit and steal from competitors and manipulate consumers.""
Source of Intel Proof of Corruption
More Intel Corp. Proof of Corruption
Intel Named in SEC Complaint, FBI Complaint and Federal RICO Lawsuit over their Part in Stealing the iViewit Technology over a Decade Ago.
Coming Soon more on Which Judges, Supreme Court Members, DOJ investigators, FTC Members, SEC members, FBI agents .. and more have supposedly investigated Intel Corp. and Did NOT Expose the Truth on Intel. Because Intel Corp. is So Big and the Kill People I am told so the Truth is ... well ya know kind of Taboo if you want to keep you and your family safe, or make a living..
Intel Corp. Controls the Government and Gets their way, Intel Corp. lobbies and gets their way,
What Does the Intel Board of Directors have to Say about This Blatant Violation of State and Federal Laws, and this Massive Shareholder and Consumer Fraud.
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Crystal@CrystalCox.com
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